Context:

SIPRI’s Yearbook 2024 reports increased nuclear weapons development and a greater reliance on nuclear deterrence by states, according to its latest assessment on armaments, disarmament, and international security.

 

Strengthening of Nuclear Arsenals Worldwide:

• Nuclear Modernisation and Expansion:

• • In 2023, the nine nuclear-armed states—United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel—continued to modernise their arsenals. 
  • By January 2024, the global inventory of nuclear warheads reached 12,121, with 9,585 in military stockpiles. 
  • Approximately 3,904 warheads were deployed with missiles and aircraft, marking an increase of 60 from the previous year. 
  • Russia and the USA kept nearly 2,100 of these deployed warheads on high operational alert.

• Increasing Arsenals:

• • The United States and Russia possess almost 90% of all nuclear weapons. 
  • Russia deployed 36 more warheads with operational forces in 2023. 
  • China’s arsenal saw the most significant growth, from 410 to 500 warheads. 
  • India, Pakistan, and North Korea are developing capabilities for multiple warhead deployment on ballistic missiles.

• Reduced Transparency:

• • Post-2022, transparency on nuclear forces declined, particularly between the USA and Russia. 

• • Russia allegedly deployed nuclear weapons in Belarus without conclusive evidence. 

• • Nuclear diplomacy faced setbacks, with Russia suspending the New START treaty and withdrawing from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

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New START Treaty: The New START Treaty between the US and Russia limits each to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 800 launchers.  It includes verification measures like on-site inspections and telemetry exchanges.  The Treaty, effective from February 2011, allows flexibility in strategic force structure and exempts missile defence and conventional strike capabilities from constraints.

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India’s Nuclear Developments:

• India expanded its arsenal from 164 to 172 warheads in 2023. 
• It developed longer-range missiles like the Agni-V, which can carry multiple nuclear warheads. 
• India’s nuclear weapons are stored de-mated, except for submarine-launched ballistic missiles which must be ready at all times.

 

No First Use (NFU) Policy:

• India maintains a No First Use (NFU) policy, committing to use nuclear weapons only in retaliation. 
• However, experts suggest India might be ready for preemptive strikes, especially against Pakistan, given its developed capabilities. 
• Despite tensions with China, India upholds the NFU policy, although strategic deception or lack of robust capabilities may underlie this stance.

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Demateted Nuclear Weapon: A demated nuclear weapon has its fissile material separated from other components, ensuring it cannot be detonated accidentally or unauthorisedly, enhancing safety during peacetime. India’s nuclear weapons are generally kept in this state, aligning with its no-first-use doctrine. However, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, like those on the INS Arihant, must be ready for immediate use, indicating some submarine-based nuclear weapons are kept in a mated configuration.

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Historical Context of India’s Nuclear Program

• Early Developments

• • India’s nuclear journey began post-independence, spearheaded by Dr. Homi Bhabha. 

• • The 1974 nuclear test was a response to perceived injustices in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
  • International sanctions followed but did not deter India’s progress.

• Doctrine and Policy

• • Post-1998 tests, India formalised its nuclear doctrine, emphasising credible minimum deterrence and NFU. 
  • The doctrine outlines massive retaliation and political control over nuclear use, stressing non-use against non-nuclear states.

 

Challenges and Strategic Considerations:

• Doctrine Debates

• • India’s adherence to NFU faces scrutiny. Some argue it allows adversaries to take the initiative, particularly with Pakistan’s low nuclear thresholds. 
  • Abandoning NFU could destabilise regional balance and strain India’s nuclear capabilities.

• Strategic Costs

• • Adopting a first-use policy would require substantial investments in nuclear arsenals and delivery systems. 
  • India’s existing arsenal is modest, and a preemptive strike on Pakistan would deplete resources, leaving it vulnerable to China.

 

Diplomatic and Security Strategies

• Global Nuclear Order

• • India’s nuclear policy promotes stability and supports its aspirations for membership in groups like the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG). 
  • Advocating for a global NFU order, India emphasises joint efforts with China to enhance nuclear security.

• Regional Stability

• • India should focus on “dissuasive deterrence” by enhancing border infrastructure and surveillance. 
  • Maintaining NFU while bolstering conventional capabilities can project strength and ensure security without escalating nuclear risks.

 

Conclusion:

• India’s nuclear doctrine reflects a commitment to responsible stewardship and strategic autonomy. 
• By maintaining a modest arsenal and an NFU policy, India aims to deter aggression while minimising nuclear risks. 
• The doctrine’s focus on credible minimum deterrence and massive retaliation underscores a cautious approach to nuclear weapons, ensuring stability in a complex international environment. 
• Advocating for global disarmament and strategic stability, India seeks to balance national security with broader disarmament goals.

Context:

Since the inauguration of Taiwan’s new President Lai Ching-te, who has expressed support for independence and secession, China has initiated advanced grey-zone warfare tactics against the island nation. 

 

What is Grey-Zone Warfare?

• It describes actions in the ambiguous space between direct conflict and peace in international relations.
• Activities: Includes economic activities, influence operations, cyberattacks, mercenary operations, assassinations, and disinformation campaigns.
• Characteristics:
  • Covert Aggression: Nations use covert or obfuscated actions to promote national objectives while avoiding direct military conflict.
  • Advantage for Lesser Powers: These tactics can help less powerful entities gain advantages over more technically advanced adversaries.

 

Key Elements:

• Below Military Response Threshold: Activities remain below the level that would justify a direct military response, frequently using non-military tools.
• Gradual Unfolding: Actions develop over time, reducing opportunities for decisive counter-responses.
• Coercive Leverage: Uses the risk of escalation to coerce the targeted state.
• Plausible Deniability: Often lacks clear attributability, enabling the aggressor to deny responsibility and obstruct deterrence.
• Legal and Political Justifications: When actions are open and attributable, aggressors use extensive legal and political arguments to justify them.
• Exploitation of Vulnerabilities: Targets specific weaknesses in the adversary, making strong responses appear counterproductive or strategically unsound.

 

Methods:

• Kinetic Actions: Use of proxies or unconventional forces for direct action.
• Non-Kinetic Actions: Cyberattacks, economic coercion, disinformation campaigns, election meddling, and weaponization of migrants.

 

Implications for India:

• Strategic Challenges:

• • India faces significant challenges from both China and Pakistan employing grey zone tactics along its borders and within neighbouring countries.
  • These tactics include infrastructure development, economic investments, and strategic partnerships aimed at encircling India and limiting its regional influence.
  • Pakistan, through irregular proxy warfare and support for transnational terrorist groups, further complicates India’s security environment, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir.

 

• Response Options:

• • Understanding and Awareness: India must enhance its understanding of grey zone threats, identify vulnerabilities, and develop comprehensive strategies to counteract these tactics.
  • Coordination and Capabilities: Effective response requires coordination among defence agencies, intelligence services, and diplomatic efforts to mitigate and counter grey zone activities.
  • Strategic Partnerships: Strengthening partnerships with like-minded countries and enhancing regional alliances can bolster India’s resilience against grey zone challenges.

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Do you Know? Cold War Legacy: During the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the United States engaged in grey-zone tactics, such as proxy wars and information warfare. However, the scope and tools available have expanded significantly since then. Technological Advancements: Globalisation, the internet, and social media have provided new mediums for conducting grey-zone activities, enhancing the ability of states and non-state actors to operate covertly and avoid clear attribution.

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Context:

The Indian Navy’s long-held demand for a third aircraft carrier is moving towards realisation.

 

More on News: 

• Cochin Shipyard Limited (CSL) is set to start construction of an add-on Vikrant-class platform weighing around 40,000 tonnes.
• Building the Indigenous Aircraft Carrier-2 (IAC-2), with upgrades and more local content than IAC-1 Vikrant also aims to maintain CSL’s carrier-building expertise.
• The Indian Navy aims to avoid the costly lapse in submarine-building expertise experienced by Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders (MDL) between 1995 and 2005.

India needs a third aircraft carrier for several reasons: 

• Operational Needs: It aims for operational readiness, ensuring one carrier for each seaboard and another in reserve.
  • This is essential to meet the navy’s requirement for comprehensive maritime security and operational flexibility.
• Strategic Balance: Supplementing existing INS Vikramaditya (Russian) and INS Vikrant (Indigenous) will bolster Indian Navy’s strategic capabilities. 
  • This would enhance India’s maritime power projection and ensure a balanced naval presence across its seaboards.
• Future Capabilities: IAC-2 will integrate technological advancements for a more potent and modern platform than its predecessors.
  • It is vital in the face of evolving maritime threats and technological advancements by adversaries

 

Concerns and Counterarguments

• Building a new aircraft carrier is extremely expensive, with costs estimated around $5-6 billion. 
  • Critics suggest allocating funds to other vital naval assets like submarines, corvettes, and destroyers, which are lacking.
• Recent advances in cruise missile technology and Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategies by China and Pakistan pose threats to carrier operations. 
  • The efficacy of a new carrier in such an environment is a point of contention.
• Some military strategists advocate for a ‘sea denial’ strategy using submarines rather than a ‘sea control’ approach with carrier battle groups. 
  • Submarines are seen as more cost-effective and less vulnerable to A2/AD threats.
• The Indian Navy faces financial constraints that have forced it to revise its goals and reduce its demand for various warships and aircraft. 
  • These fiscal limitations also affect the Navy’s ability to pursue a balanced and comprehensive force structure.
• The Indian Air Force (IAF) and Indian Army compete for a share of the defence budget, which is already stretched thin. 
  • IAF veterans argue that aircraft carriers are a costly indulgence. 
  • Instead, advanced fighter aircraft like SEPECAT Jaguar and Sukhoi Su-30MKI are more cost-effective and secure means of projecting air power.

Conclusion

• Despite cost and strategic debates, decision to build a third aircraft carrier shows the Indian Navy’s commitment to maintaining maritime capabilities and readiness.
• Balancing this with the need to address other critical naval and military requirements will be essential for a holistic and sustainable defence strategy.

Context : Varsha

India is developing a secret nuclear submarine base under Project Varsha.

 

More on News: 

• The most intriguing feature of the project is an underground complex to house a fleet of 12 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines(SSBNs).
• This base will cater to a wide range of navy operations and will reduce congestion on  Eastern Naval Command at Visakhapatnam.

About the Project Varsha: 

• It is an underground fortress Naval Base providing crucial nuclear engineering support facilities, ensuring the base’s self-sufficiency.
• This Naval Base is located 60 km south of Visakhapatnam at Rambilli in Andhra Pradesh.
• Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) is constructing a research and development complex at Achutapuram 20 km from the naval base.
  • It will support the base submarines by constructing and fitting nuclear reactors
• The new base will support all 8-12 Arihant-class submarines to be built for the Indian Navy.
  • It will include state-of-the-art nuclear engineering support facilities and extensive crew accommodation.

 

Need of the Fortress: 

• The new base can accommodate other naval vessels because of the Indian Navy’s expansion.
• Built strategically, it will serve as an exclusive enclave with easy access to the Bay of Bengal.
• While designed principally as a nuclear submarine support facility it will include underground berths on INS Arihant and other nuke missile-armed submarines. 
• To counter China’s presence in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.
  • China is building ports in India’s neighbouring countries like Kyaukphyu Port in Myanmar, Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, and Payra Deep Sea Port in Bangladesh.

 

About India’s Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN): 

• India has a type of submarine called SSBN, which is powered by a nuclear reactor and can launch nuclear-tipped missiles. 
• INS Arihant: India’s first indigenous nuclear-powered submarine, launched in 2009 and commissioned in 2016.

• • INS Arihant and its class of submarines are classified as ‘SSBN’.
  • Designed and developed under the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project, which started in the 1980s.
  • The ATV project marked India’s entry into designing and building nuclear-powered submarines.