Saudi–Pakistan Defence Pact: A Keystone Compact

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Saudi–Pakistan Defence Pact: A Keystone Compact
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Saudi–Pakistan Defence Pact: A Keystone Compact

Explore the 2025 Saudi–Pakistan defence pact (SMDA): history, nuclear angle, collective security vision, and implications for India & West Asia.

Saudi–Pakistan Defence Pact: A Keystone Compact

Introduction

On 17 September 2025, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif signed the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) in Riyadh. Also present was Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, a reminder that the deal is rooted as much in military logic as in political diplomacy. The SMDA promises that the two countries will support one another in times of crisis. In The Hindu (20 September 2025), Mahesh Sachdev dismisses this accord as a “dodgy insurance policy,” arguing that it is weak, unreliable, and based on mistrust. His criticism rests on the view that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have never sustained deep defence cooperation and are mainly pursuing narrow self-interest. Yet this sceptical view underestimates the agreement’s true importance. This essay argues that the SMDA should be seen instead as a cornerstone of collective security. It is a pact that draws strength from complementary abilities, adapts lessons from a troubled past, and responds to urgent modern threats.

Fractured Brotherhood

The story of Saudi–Pakistani military ties is indeed mixed. During the 1980s, around 20,000 Pakistani troops were stationed in the Kingdom to protect its holy sites and act as a shield against possible threats from Iran and Yemen. While this deployment initially appeared strong, the relationship soon soured. Saudi leaders treated the Pakistanis more like hired guards than equal partners, while Pakistani officers bristled at being commanded by outsiders. Religious tensions, such as the Saudi refusal to accept Shia soldiers in the contingent, further weakened trust. By 1990 the Pakistani troops were sent home, and later, when Saudi Arabia sought support during the Gulf War and the Yemen conflict, Islamabad declined to send its soldiers. These episodes gave rise to disappointment and suspicion on both sides.

Critics such as Sachdev claim that this history proves future cooperation will collapse again. Yet such a conclusion misses the fact that history can also serve as a teacher. Unlike the ad hoc deployments of the 1980s, the SMDA is a formally codified treaty with defined obligations, joint training provisions, and standing consultative mechanisms. The agreement includes plans for regular joint military exercises and a permanent liaison framework between Riyadh and Rawalpindi. These institutional features mean that cooperation is no longer based on vague understandings or personal ties between rulers, but on structured channels of coordination. This makes the SMDA more resilient and less vulnerable to the misunderstandings that sank earlier arrangements.

Changing Geopolitics

The international setting today is very different from what it was in the late twentieth century. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan face a set of challenges that make closer cooperation not just desirable but essential. Iran’s growing influence across the region, its support for groups in Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq, and its nuclear ambitions are concerns shared by both Riyadh and Islamabad. At the same time, the United States, long the main protector of Saudi Arabia, appears less reliable. When Israel carried out an air strike on Qatar in September 2025, Washington failed to act, even though Qatar hosts a major American base. This undermined confidence in US guarantees. Added to this is the ever-present risk of escalation between Israel and Iran, which makes the region more dangerous than at any point in recent decades.

In such a climate, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan concluded that they could not rely on external powers alone. They needed an agreement that would bind two of the most important Muslim states together. The SMDA, signed at this critical moment, therefore reflects necessity as much as choice.

Complementary Strengths

One of the reasons the SMDA carries weight is that the two partners bring very different strengths which complement one another. Saudi Arabia has immense financial resources and some of the most advanced weapons systems in the world, purchased mainly from the United States. Yet the Kingdom has long struggled to develop a large and experienced fighting force that can fully use these weapons. Pakistan, on the other hand, has one of the world’s largest and most battle-tested armies. It also possesses nuclear weapons and a professional officer corps with decades of experience. What Pakistan lacks is money and access to cutting-edge equipment.

Together, these strengths create a powerful combination. Saudi money and weapons paired with Pakistani manpower and expertise result in a credible defence alliance. In this sense, the SMDA resembles the logic behind NATO during the Cold War, where American industrial power and technology were matched by European soldiers and strategic depth. The agreement thus creates a force greater than the sum of its parts.

Towards Collective Security

Sachdev dismisses the SMDA as a narrow bargain that helps Riyadh feel more secure and allows Islamabad to earn money. But such a view ignores the broader implications. The agreement can be seen as the first step towards a wider Islamic collective security framework. Saudi Arabia is the custodian of Islam’s two holiest sites, while Pakistan is the only Muslim state with nuclear capability. When these two powers join forces, it sends a message of self-reliance to the rest of the Muslim world.

Other Gulf states, such as Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar, may see in this pact an opportunity to join or coordinate with a new security structure that is not wholly dependent on the United States. Over time, the SMDA could evolve into a regional defence arrangement similar to NATO, where the security of one is tied to the security of all. Far from being a desperate deal, it is therefore a cornerstone on which broader regional security could be built.

The Nuclear Question

One of the most sensitive issues is the nuclear dimension. Critics worry that Pakistan might transfer nuclear weapons or technology to Saudi Arabia, recalling the scandal involving A.Q. Khan’s network. Sachdev points to this as a dangerous possibility. Yet this scenario is unlikely. A direct transfer of nuclear weapons would trigger international outrage and almost certainly provoke Israeli retaliation.

What is more realistic is a form of deliberate ambiguity. The SMDA allows for the possibility that Pakistan could extend a form of nuclear protection to Saudi Arabia without transferring weapons. In other words, if Riyadh were threatened with nuclear attack, its enemies might fear that Pakistan would respond. This “nuclear umbrella” provides deterrence without breaking international rules. In fact, it could reduce the likelihood of Saudi Arabia developing its own nuclear programme, making the region more stable.

Shared but Different Benefits

It is true that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan do not enter this pact with identical aims. Saudi Arabia wants security and a credible partner to deter threats, especially from Iran. Pakistan wants financial support, oil, and access to advanced technology to help its struggling economy and modernise its military. Sachdev interprets these differences as proof that the pact is unstable. Yet many strong alliances are built on different but complementary needs. During the Cold War, the United States and its allies had differing goals, but together they sustained NATO for decades.

The SMDA offers both partners what they most require. Riyadh gains a reliable partner with manpower and nuclear deterrence, while Islamabad gains the economic and military resources it cannot secure alone. This is a balance of needs that gives the pact resilience.

Implications for India

For India, the SMDA naturally raises concerns. It strengthens Pakistan, its long-standing rival, and could provide Islamabad with resources that alter the balance in South Asia. Sachdev suggests that Saudi Arabia reassured India and values its trading relationship enough to maintain balance. There is truth in this: Saudi Arabia remains a key partner for India, particularly in energy and trade, and has an interest in keeping those ties strong.

At the same time, the pact does strengthen Pakistan’s position. While Saudi–Indian economic relations are robust, this weight cannot by itself offset the strategic reality that Riyadh is now underwriting Pakistan’s stability. Saudi financial aid and military cooperation directly enhance Pakistan’s capacity, regardless of India’s market size. Indeed, Saudi leaders may well compartmentalise: maintaining close trade with India while simultaneously reinforcing Pakistan militarily. This dual-track approach limits India’s leverage. Far from being fully reassured, New Delhi must accept that the SMDA redistributes power in South Asia by easing Pakistan’s vulnerabilities and indirectly complicating India’s strategic calculations.

Conclusion

The Saudi–Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement is far more than the “dodgy insurance policy” described by Mahesh Sachdev. It is a cornerstone of collective security in a region where old alliances are weakening and new arrangements are urgently needed. It builds on lessons from a difficult past, responds to present dangers, and brings together the complementary strengths of Saudi wealth and Pakistani manpower.

The nuclear question, often seen as a risk, may in fact provide stability by offering deterrence without spreading weapons. The differences in aims between the two countries make the pact practical rather than fragile, since each side gains exactly what it needs. For India, the pact presents challenges, but it may also reinforce incentives for restraint.

In sum, the SMDA is not a desperate gamble but a bold and necessary step. Like NATO at its birth, it may appear uncertain, yet it holds the potential to grow into a foundation for regional security. It is better seen not as a weak insurance plan but as the keystone of a new security order in West Asia, with significant repercussions for South Asia as well.


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The Source’s Authority and Ownership of the Article is Claimed By THE STUDY IAS BY MANIKANT SINGH

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