Constitutional Amendment Process in India: Procedure and Limitations

India’s Constitution has survived for decades not because its provisions are beyond change, but because it allows change through a defined constitutional process. Since 1950, amendments have been used to reshape political representation, introduce new governance arrangements and respond to changing social and economic needs. Yet Parliament cannot change every part of the Constitution simply because it has enough votes to pass an amendment.

Article 368, which forms part of Part XX of the Constitution, lays down the procedure for constitutional amendments. Its interpretation has also been shaped by a long series of Supreme Court judgments. The central question has remained the same: how far can Parliament go in changing the Constitution without undermining the principles on which it rests? The answer lies in the relationship between Parliament’s amending power, the federal structure and the basic structure doctrine.

What Is a Constitutional Amendment?

A constitutional amendment is a formal change to the Constitution. It may add a provision, modify an existing one or remove a provision through the procedure prescribed for that change. Unlike an ordinary law, which operates within the constitutional framework, a constitutional amendment changes the framework itself.

The Indian Constitution does not follow one uniform procedure for every constitutional change. Some matters can be altered by Parliament through a simple majority, while most amendments require a special majority in both Houses. Changes affecting specified federal arrangements also require ratification by at least half of the State Legislatures. This distinction reflects the Constitution’s attempt to make amendment possible without allowing fundamental changes to be made too easily.

Constitutional Provisions Governing the Amendment Process

Article 368 is the principal provision governing formal constitutional amendments. It authorises Parliament to amend the Constitution by addition, variation or repeal, subject to the prescribed procedure and constitutional limitations. However, not every change involving a constitutional provision must be made under Article 368. The Constitution itself permits certain matters to be changed through ordinary legislation.

Articles 2, 3 and 169 provide familiar examples of this distinction. Parliament can form new States or alter existing State boundaries under Articles 2 and 3, following the applicable procedure. Similarly, Parliament may provide for the creation or abolition of a State Legislative Council under Article 169. These changes do not follow the formal amendment procedure under Article 368, even though they may have constitutional consequences.

Article 13 is also relevant to the history of constitutional amendments. The 24th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1971, inserted Article 13(4) and amended Article 368 to clarify Parliament’s authority to amend the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, under the prescribed procedure. However, this did not give Parliament unlimited power. The Supreme Court subsequently held that even a constitutional amendment can be invalidated if it damages or destroys the Constitution’s basic structure.

Types of Constitutional Amendments in India

Amendment by Simple Majority

Certain constitutional changes can be made through an ordinary legislative process, using the applicable simple-majority rule. These changes fall outside the formal procedure under Article 368. The precise procedure depends on the relevant constitutional provision and cannot be assumed to be the same for every legislative matter.

For instance, under Article 3, Parliament can alter the boundaries or names of States after following the prescribed procedure, including referring the proposal to the concerned State Legislature for its views. The State Legislature’s views are not binding on Parliament. A law passed under Articles 2 and 3 may also make consequential changes to the First and Fourth Schedules without being treated as an amendment under Article 368.

This category is important because it shows that the Constitution combines different amendment mechanisms rather than treating every change as equally demanding. However, Parliament cannot use the simple-majority route where the Constitution specifically requires a special majority or State ratification.

Amendment by Special Majority of Parliament

Most constitutional amendments must be passed by a special majority in each House of Parliament. Under Article 368, this requires two conditions to be satisfied together: a majority of the total membership of the House and a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting. Consider a House with a total membership of 500. At least 251 members must vote in favour to meet the total-membership requirement. If 300 members are present and voting, at least 200 must support the Bill to meet the two-thirds requirement. Since both conditions apply, the Bill would need at least 251 affirmative votes in this example.

The two requirements serve different purposes. The first prevents an amendment from passing without the support of a majority of the House’s total membership. The second requires substantial agreement among those participating in the vote. Amendments to many constitutional provisions, including provisions concerning Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy, fall within this category unless the subject also triggers the requirement of State ratification.

Amendment by Special Majority and State Ratification

Some constitutional amendments require more than parliamentary approval because they affect the federal relationship between the Union and the States. In these cases, the Bill must first secure the prescribed special majority in both Houses of Parliament. It must then be ratified by the Legislatures of at least half of the States before being presented to the President for assent.

The proviso to Article 368(2) identifies the matters for which State ratification is necessary. These include the election of the President under Articles 54 and 55; the extent of the executive powers of the Union and the States under Articles 73 and 162; Article 241; the Supreme Court and High Courts provisions specified in Part V and Part VI; the distribution of legislative powers under Chapter I of Part XI; any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule; the representation of States in Parliament; and Article 368 itself.

The purpose of this requirement is to prevent Parliament from unilaterally changing certain essential features of the federal arrangement. State ratification does not apply to every constitutional amendment, but where the Constitution requires it, parliamentary approval alone is insufficient.

Procedure for Passing a Constitutional Amendment Bill

The process begins with the introduction of a Constitutional Amendment Bill in either the Lok Sabha or the Rajya Sabha. Unlike a Money Bill, it can originate in either House, and Article 368 does not require the President’s prior recommendation for its introduction. A State Legislature cannot initiate an amendment under Article 368.

The Bill must then be passed separately by both Houses with the required majority. Where Article 368 applies, each House must satisfy the special-majority requirement. The Houses cannot substitute a joint sitting for this separate approval. If one House rejects the Bill or fails to pass it, the amendment cannot proceed through the constitutional process. Where the amendment concerns a matter listed in the proviso to Article 368(2), ratification by at least half of the State Legislatures is also required. The Constitution does not prescribe a specific deadline for this ratification. The requirement must be met before the Bill is presented to the President.

Once the necessary parliamentary approvals and, where applicable, State ratification have been secured, the Bill is presented to the President. Article 368 states that the President shall give assent to a Constitutional Amendment Bill passed in accordance with the required procedure. After assent, the Constitution stands amended in accordance with the terms of the Act.

Limitations on Parliament’s Amending Power

The Basic Structure Doctrine

The most important substantive limitation on Parliament’s amending power is the basic structure doctrine. The Constitution does not provide a complete list of features that make up its basic structure. Instead, the doctrine has developed through judicial interpretation, particularly through the Supreme Court’s decisions on the scope of Article 368.

In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), a 13-judge Bench of the Supreme Court held by a 7:6 majority that Parliament could amend any part of the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, but could not alter or destroy its basic structure. The judgment marked a turning point in Indian constitutional law. It recognised Parliament’s authority to respond to changing needs while holding that the Constitution has an essential identity that cannot be removed through amendment.

The Court has recognised features such as constitutional supremacy, democracy, secularism, federalism, judicial review, the rule of law, separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary as elements of the basic structure in various judgments. This does not mean that every amendment touching these subjects is automatically invalid. The question is whether the amendment damages or destroys an essential feature of the Constitution.

Judicial Review

Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution is subject to judicial review. The Supreme Court can examine whether an amendment was passed in accordance with the required procedure and whether it violates the basic structure doctrine. This prevents the amending power from becoming a means of removing constitutional checks and balances.

The importance of judicial review became particularly clear during the constitutional disputes of the 1970s. Attempts to place certain matters beyond judicial scrutiny led the Court to consider whether Parliament could use an amendment to restrict the very mechanisms that enforce constitutional limits. The Court’s answer was that the amending power cannot be used to destroy the constitutional framework within which that power exists.

Procedural Requirements and Federal Safeguards

The Constitution’s amendment procedure is itself a limitation on Parliament. Where a special majority is required, the prescribed conditions must be satisfied in each House independently. Where State ratification is required, the approval of at least half of the State Legislatures must be obtained before the Bill is presented to the President. Failure to comply with a mandatory constitutional requirement can render an amendment invalid.

These procedural safeguards are especially significant in a federal system. States do not have an equal role in every constitutional amendment, but the Constitution gives them a formal part in changes affecting specified federal arrangements. This helps prevent the Union Parliament from changing those arrangements through its own votes alone.

Parliament Cannot Make Its Amending Power Unlimited

The limits on Parliament’s amending power cannot themselves be removed simply by declaring that Parliament has unlimited authority. In Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980), the Supreme Court struck down provisions introduced by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976, that attempted to exclude judicial review of constitutional amendments and remove limitations on Parliament’s amending power.

The judgment reaffirmed that limited amending power is itself part of the basic structure. Parliament can change the Constitution, but it cannot use that authority to abolish the constitutional limits governing its own power. The decision also emphasised the importance of maintaining a balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy.

Landmark Supreme Court Judgments

The present understanding of constitutional amendments emerged through a series of cases in which the Supreme Court reconsidered the relationship between Parliament and Fundamental Rights.

In Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951), the Court upheld the First Constitutional Amendment Act and held that a constitutional amendment under Article 368 was not a law within the meaning of Article 13. The Court therefore accepted Parliament’s authority to amend Fundamental Rights through the constitutional amendment process. In Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1965), the Court followed this approach, although some judges raised concerns about the extent of Parliament’s power.

The position changed in I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967). By a narrow majority, the Court held that Parliament could not amend Fundamental Rights under the interpretation it adopted in that case. The decision intensified the constitutional debate and was later reconsidered in Kesavananda Bharati. The 24th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1971, also responded to this dispute by expressly clarifying Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution.

The basic structure doctrine was subsequently applied in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975), where the Supreme Court invalidated a provision of the 39th Constitutional Amendment that sought to place the election of the Prime Minister beyond ordinary judicial scrutiny. The case demonstrated that constitutional amendments affecting democratic accountability and the rule of law remain subject to constitutional limits.

In Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980), the Court reaffirmed the limits on Parliament’s amending power and the importance of judicial review. Later, in I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007), a nine-judge Bench held that laws placed in the Ninth Schedule through constitutional amendments made after 24 April 1973 could be reviewed where their impact damaged or destroyed the basic structure. Inclusion in the Ninth Schedule, therefore, does not automatically place a law beyond constitutional scrutiny.

Taken together, these judgments show that the amendment process is not governed by parliamentary procedure alone. The scope of the amendment, its effect on constitutional principles and compliance with the required procedure all matter when its validity is examined.

Constitutional Amendment and Ordinary Law: Key Differences

A constitutional amendment changes the Constitution itself, whereas an ordinary law creates or modifies statutory rules within the constitutional framework. The two also differ in the legislative procedure and majority requirements that apply. An ordinary law cannot be used as a substitute for the procedure prescribed by Article 368, and a constitutional amendment cannot escape the basic structure limitation merely because it has secured the required votes.

Why the Constitutional Amendment Process Matters

The amendment process allows the Constitution to respond to changing circumstances without making constitutional change dependent on the same procedure as ordinary legislation. The special-majority requirement encourages broader agreement in Parliament, while State ratification provides an additional safeguard for specified federal matters. These mechanisms make constitutional change possible but require greater consensus when the change affects the country’s fundamental institutional arrangements.

At the same time, the basic structure doctrine draws a boundary around the amending power. It does not freeze the Constitution or prevent Parliament from reforming it. Rather, it ensures that amendments do not destroy the essential features that sustain constitutional democracy. The relationship between parliamentary authority and judicial review remains central to understanding how India balances constitutional flexibility with continuity.

Frequently Asked Questions

Which Article of the Indian Constitution deals with the amendment process?

Article 368, located in Part XX of the Constitution, governs the formal constitutional amendment procedure. It sets out the parliamentary majority required for amendments and identifies matters for which ratification by at least half of the State Legislatures is also necessary. Certain changes can be made through simple-majority legislation under other constitutional provisions.

What is the difference between a simple majority and a special majority?

A simple majority generally refers to more than half of the members present and voting, subject to the relevant constitutional provision and legislative procedure. Under Article 368, a special majority requires a majority of the total membership of each House and at least two-thirds of the members present and voting. Some amendments also require State ratification.

Can a Constitutional Amendment Bill be introduced in either House of Parliament?

Yes. A Constitutional Amendment Bill under Article 368 may be introduced in either the Lok Sabha or the Rajya Sabha. It must be passed separately by both Houses with the prescribed majority. A joint sitting cannot be used to resolve a disagreement over such a Bill.

Is State ratification necessary for every constitutional amendment?

No. Ratification by at least half of the State Legislatures is required only when an amendment affects the matters specified in the proviso to Article 368(2). These include certain provisions relating to the election of the President, Union-State powers, the judiciary, the Seventh Schedule, State representation in Parliament and Article 368 itself.

What is the basic structure doctrine?

The basic structure doctrine was established in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973). It holds that Parliament may amend the Constitution but cannot alter or destroy its essential features. Constitutional supremacy, democracy, federalism and judicial review are among the principles recognised by the Supreme Court as elements of the basic structure.

Can Parliament amend Fundamental Rights?

Yes. Parliament can amend Fundamental Rights through Article 368, provided the amendment follows the required procedure and does not damage or destroy the Constitution’s basic structure. This limitation was established in Kesavananda Bharati and reaffirmed in later judgments.

Can the President return a Constitutional Amendment Bill for reconsideration?

Article 368 states that the President shall give assent to a Constitutional Amendment Bill passed according to the prescribed procedure. Unlike the ordinary legislative process, Article 368 does not provide an option to return such a Bill to Parliament for reconsideration.

Conclusion

India’s constitutional amendment process rests on two principles: the Constitution must be capable of change, but the authority to change it is not unlimited. Article 368 provides the formal procedure for most amendments, while special-majority requirements and State ratification protect against changes made without the necessary constitutional consensus.

The basic structure doctrine adds a substantive limit to this process. Through decisions such as Kesavananda Bharati, Minerva Mills and I.R. Coelho, the Supreme Court has clarified that Parliament cannot use its amending power to destroy the Constitution’s essential features. For UPSC aspirants, understanding the amendment procedure alongside these judgments is more useful than memorising the provisions in isolation, because it reveals how Parliament, the States and the judiciary interact to preserve India’s constitutional framework.

For further reading, explore related articles on Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy, the Basic Structure Doctrine, and the powers of Parliament under the Constitution.

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The Source’s Authority and Ownership of the Article is Claimed ByTHE STUDY IAS BY MANIKANT SINGH