Context: On the birth anniversary of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Telangana Chief Minister A. Revanth Reddy declared that the Congress party would amend the law to reduce the minimum age for contesting Assembly elections from 25 to 21 years. 

How can the minimum age be changed for all elections in India?

Changing the minimum age to contest elections requires a Constitutional Amendment because the provisions are embedded in the Constitution itself (Articles 84 and 173). The process is rigorous and involves the following steps:

• Introduction of a Constitutional Amendment Bill: The bill must be introduced in either house of Parliament.
• Special Majority Passage: The bill must be passed in each house by a special majority – that is, a majority of the total membership of that house and a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that house present and voting.
• Ratification by States: If the amendment affects federal structure or representation (which an amendment to Articles 84 and 173 likely would), it must also be ratified by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the states.
• Presidential Assent: After clearing Parliament and, if necessary, the states, the bill is presented to the President for assent, after which it becomes law.

What can be the implications of reducing the minimum age for contesting elections in India?

Reducing the minimum age to contest elections is a double-edged sword with several potential implications:

• Potential Advantages:
  • Enhanced Youth Representation: It could lead to greater inclusion of young voices in legislatures, making the law-making process more reflective of the aspirations of India’s large youth population.
  • Fresh Perspectives: Younger lawmakers could bring innovative ideas, technological savvy, and new approaches to solving persistent problems like unemployment, education reform, and climate change.
  • Increased Political Engagement: Lowering the barrier to entry could motivate more young people to engage with the political process beyond just voting, strengthening democratic participation.
• Potential Challenges and Disadvantages:
  • Lack of Experience: Critics argue that individuals aged 21 might lack the necessary life experience, maturity, and administrative understanding to handle complex legislative and governance issues.
  • Vulnerability to Manipulation: Young candidates could be more susceptible to manipulation by senior party leaders, corporate interests, or other powerful entities, potentially becoming proxy representatives rather than independent voices.
  • Financial and Political Hurdles: Election campaigning requires significant resources and political networking. Younger individuals may find it disproportionately difficult to compete against established, older politicians with deeper pockets and stronger networks.
  • Tokenism: There is a risk that parties might field young candidates as token symbols without giving them real power or responsibility, failing to achieve the goal of genuine representation.

Context: A Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) is currently reviewing the Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Bill, 2024, popularly known as the “One Nation, One Election” (ONOE) Bill. 

What is One Nation, One Election (ONOE)?

• One Nation, One Election (ONOE) is a proposal to synchronise the election cycles for the Lok Sabha (the lower house of India’s Parliament) and all State Legislative Assemblies. 
• The goal is to hold elections for both tiers of government simultaneously, or in a phased manner, within a specific timeframe.
• The core mechanism proposed in the 2024 Bill involves:
  • Inserting Article 82A into the Constitution to facilitate the synchronisation of elections.
  • Amending Articles 83 and 172, which currently dictate the terms of the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies, respectively, to allow for this new synchronised system.
  • Creating a legal framework where an election to a state assembly, if dissolved prematurely, would only be held for the remainder of the term, ensuring the next election realigns with the next synchronised cycle.
• The idea is to move away from the current system where elections are held almost continuously throughout the year in different states and for the national parliament.

What are the major concerns?

Despite the proposed benefits, the ONOE proposal faces substantial criticism and legal hurdles, as highlighted by the former CJIs:

• Constitutional and Federal Challenges: The most significant concern is that it undermines India’s federal structure. 
  • Synchronisation could force a state government with a clear majority to dissolve its assembly prematurely if the Lok Sabha falls, or vice-versa, blurring the distinct mandates given by the electorate to state and national governments.
• Unfettered Power to ECI: As Justice Khanna pointed out, Clause 5 of the proposed Bill grants the Election Commission excessive discretion to decide when a state election cannot be held simultaneously. 
  • This power is seen as “arbitrary” and a potential violation of Article 14 (Right to Equality). Critics fear it could be misused for political ends.
• Threat of Indirect President’s Rule: The power to postpone state elections could effectively allow the Union government to run a state without an elected government for an extended period, functioning as a backdoor method to impose President’s Rule without invoking Article 356, which is subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
• Subversion of Democracy: If a state government loses its majority mid-term, forcing an election only for the remainder of the term could be seen as subverting the people’s mandate and denying them the right to elect a full-term government.
• Overshadowing Regional Issues: A major fear is that simultaneous elections would lead to national issues and national parties dominating the campaign narrative, thereby sidelining critical state-specific and local issues and marginalising regional parties.
• Logistical Nightmare: While aiming to simplify logistics, the sheer scale of managing a single election for over 900 million voters for both national and state levels presents an unprecedented logistical challenge for the ECI.

Context: The Union Home Ministry recently submitted an affidavit to the Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and Ladakh High Court stating that the Lieutenant Governor (LG) of J&K can nominate five members to the Legislative Assembly without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. 

More on News

• The Indian Constitution allows for nominated members in Parliament and State Legislatures, but the process differs between States and Union Territories (UTs). 
• While nominated members in States are appointed on the advice of the Council of Ministers, the rules for UTs like J&K and Puducherry are governed by parliamentary statutes, leading to debates over executive discretion versus democratic principles.

Why are members nominated in State Legislative Assemblies and Parliament?

Nominated members are included in legislatures to ensure representation of expertise and underrepresented communities. The rationale includes:

• Expertise & Distinguished Service: The Rajya Sabha nominates 12 members from fields like literature, science, arts, and social service to bring specialised knowledge into legislative debates.
• Balanced Deliberation: Nominated members contribute non-partisan perspectives, enriching legislative discussions.
• However, in UTs like J&K and Puducherry, nominations serve additional purposes:
  • • Representation of Displaced Communities: J&K’s Assembly can nominate two Kashmiri migrants and one PoK displaced person to address their political exclusion.
    • Gender Representation: Two women can be nominated to enhance gender balance.

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Judicial Perspectives

The Madras High Court (2018) upheld the Centre’s power to nominate members in Puducherry without UT Ministers’ advice. The Supreme Court (2023, NCT of Delhi v. Union of India) emphasised the ‘triple chain of accountability’—ministers accountable to legislature, legislature to people.

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How are nominations to State Legislative Assemblies, Parliament, and UT Legislative Assemblies different?

The process of nominating members varies significantly across different legislative bodies in India.

• Parliament (Rajya Sabha): Under Article 80 of the Constitution, the President nominates 12 members to the Rajya Sabha based on their distinguished contributions to fields like literature, science, art, or social service. 
  • • This nomination is made on the advice of the Union Council of Ministers, ensuring that experts are included in parliamentary debates.
• State Legislative Councils: For states with bicameral legislatures (like Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra), Article 171 allows the Governor to nominate one-sixth of the total members to the Legislative Council. 
  • • These nominations are made on the advice of the State Council of Ministers, maintaining democratic accountability.
• Union Territories (Puducherry): Unlike states, the nomination process in UTs is governed by parliamentary laws. 
  • • Section 3 of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 permits the Central Government (not the UT’s Council of Ministers) to nominate up to three members to the Puducherry Legislative Assembly.
• Jammu & Kashmir Assembly: The J&K Reorganisation Act, 2019 (as amended in 2023) allows the Lieutenant Governor (LG) to nominate five members—two women, two Kashmiri migrants, and one displaced person from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). 
• Key Differences:
  • • In the States and Parliament, nominations are made on the advice of elected governments, ensuring democratic legitimacy.
    • In UTs like Puducherry and J&K, the Centre or LG holds nomination powers, leading to debates over executive discretion versus legislative autonomy.
    • The purpose of nomination also differs—while Rajya Sabha nominations focus on expertise, UT nominations often aim at political representation of specific communities.

Financial Autonomy of Panchayats: A Powerful Step Towards Inclusive Rural Development

Context: The government is drafting a model framework to help panchayats enhance their own source of revenue (OSR), reducing dependence on central and state funds. A panel under the Panchayati Raj Ministry is preparing a blueprint to guide states and UTs in framing and updating OSR rules for greater financial autonomy at the grassroots level.

What are the major challenges associated with the Own Source of Revenue (OSR) for Panchayats?

The 73rd Constitutional Amendment (1992) empowered Panchayats under Article 243H to levy and collect taxes, duties, tolls, and fees. However, their OSR remains weak due to:

• Absence of OSR rules: Nearly a dozen states/UTs lack regulatory frameworks, leading to under-collection (MoPR, 2025).
• Low contribution to budgets: OSR forms only 10–15% of Panchayat budgets in most states (Economic Survey 2022-23).
• Centralisation of revenue powers: States often retain authority over property tax and natural resource revenues, restricting Panchayat autonomy (NITI Aayog, 2022).
• Capacity deficits: Lack of trained staff to assess, collect, and manage taxes, as highlighted in Odisha and Madhya Pradesh studies.
• Leakages and inefficiencies: Poor digitalisation and weak audit mechanisms reduce transparency in collections (Down to Earth, 2023).

How can this be addressed?

• Devolution Index Insights: The Panchayat Devolution Index (PDI-2024), developed by IIPA, shows wide variations:

• • • Top Performers: Karnataka (72.23), Kerala (70.59), Tamil Nadu (68.38) – strong in finances and accountability.
    • Low Performers: Jharkhand (27.73), Puducherry (16.16) – weak staffing and financial devolution.
    • National Trend: Financial devolution improved modestly from 32.05 (2013-14) to 37.04 (2021-22), still below desired levels.

Thus, this variation needs to be bridged. 

• Finance Commission Support

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Constitutional basis for fiscal devolution to Panchayats

• Article 243H: Enables Panchayats to levy, collect, and appropriate taxes, duties, tolls, and fees.
• Article 243I & 243Y: Mandates State Finance Commissions (SFCs) every five years to recommend devolution.
• Articles 280 & 275: Finance Commissions at the Union level provide grants to augment Panchayat resources.

Yet, irregular constitutions of SFCs and delays in fund transfers undermine this constitutional intent.

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• • 14th FC: Allocated ₹2.87 lakh crore to local bodies (2015-20).
  • 15th FC: Enhanced this to ₹4.36 lakh crore (2021-26), with 60% tied grants for sanitation and drinking water.

•  Case Studies

• • Kerala’s People’s Plan Campaign: Enabled Panchayats to plan and execute projects independently.
  • Karnataka’s Decentralised Financial Management: Ensured timely release of FC funds, strengthening OSR reliance.

• Other Measures

• • Digital tax platforms (e-Gram Swaraj).
  • Capacity building under Rashtriya Gram Swaraj Abhiyan (2018).
  • Strengthened social audits and Gram Sabhas for accountability.

Context: On August 15, 2025, Chief Justice of India (CJI) B.R. Gavai clarified that the Supreme Court (SC) Collegium cannot impose names on High Court (HC) Collegiums for judicial appointments.

What Are the Functions of the High Court Collegium System?

The High Court Collegium System is responsible for:

• Recommending names for the appointment of judges to the High Court.
• Evaluating the suitability of candidates (including district judges and advocates).
• Consulting with the Supreme Court Collegium and the central government before finalising appointments.
• Reviewing proposals for elevation, transfer, or removal of judges.
• Ensuring transparency in judicial appointments, though critics argue the process remains opaque.

Does the Autonomy of the High Court Collegium Ensure an Integrated Judiciary?

• Federal Balance: CJI Gavai stressed that HCs and SC are constitutional equals, ensuring decentralised decision-making.
• Checks & Balances: HC Collegiums act as first-level filters, preventing unilateral SC control over appointments.
• Delays & Friction: Government delays in clearing recommendations (29 pending since 2022) create vacancies. Selective appointments by the Centre have led to tensions with the judiciary.
• Global Comparison: Unlike the UK (where an independent Judicial Appointments Commission exists), India’s system lacks statutory backing, leading to executive-judiciary tussles.

Can’t Strike Down a Law Over Misuse: SC Issues Strong Clarification

Context: The Supreme Court has agreed to hear a challenge to Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, which replaces the sedition law in the IPC, clarifying that a law cannot be invalidated solely due to its potential for misuse.

What is Sedition?

Sedition refers to acts, speech, or publications that incite hatred, disaffection, or disloyalty towards the government, potentially leading to public disorder or threats to sovereignty. It was introduced in 1870 under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) by the British to curb nationalist movements.

• Static Provision (Pre-2024): Punishable with imprisonment up to life.
• Judicial Interpretation: In Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962), the Supreme Court upheld sedition’s constitutionality but restricted its scope to acts involving “incitement to violence” or “public disorder,” aligning it with Article 19(2) of the Constitution.

How was it used in post-independent India, and what is the stance of the judiciary?

• Post-Independence Use

• • • Criticism: Civil society and media reports noted misuse against journalists, activists, and political dissenters, often without proven violence.
    • Data: NCRB data shows an increase in sedition cases between 2014-2020, but with low conviction rates, indicating possible overreach.

• Judicial Stance

• • In May 2022, the SC in SG Vombatkere vs Union of India kept all pending sedition cases in abeyance, recognising concerns of vagueness and misuse.
  • In Shreya Singhal vs Union of India (2015), the Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act for vagueness, establishing that unclear laws can have a “chilling effect” on free speech.

Should Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita be ruled down?

• Section 152 Overview

• • • Replaces Section 124A IPC in the new Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), in force from July 1, 2024.
    • Criminalises acts “endangering sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India” through words (spoken/written), symbols, or other means, with an explanatory clause.

• Arguments Against

• • • Similarity to Sedition: Critics, including senior advocate Nitya Ramakrishnan, argue it mirrors old sedition provisions, enabling misuse against journalists.
    • Vagueness: Petitioner SG Vombatkere contends the provision’s sweeping language—covering even symbolic or financial acts—fails the constitutional test of precision, risking a chilling effect on dissent.
    • Freedom of Speech Impact: Economic Survey 2022-23 highlighted the role of robust public debate in governance; vague penal provisions could undermine this.

• Arguments For

• • National Security Need: Solicitor General Tushar Mehta argued the law targets only clear threats to sovereignty and includes explanatory safeguards.
  • Legislative Power: SC observed that misuse is an enforcement issue, not necessarily a legislative flaw, unless vagueness or constitutional violation is proven.

Article 370 Abrogation: Six Years On, A Revealing Look at J&K’s Journey

Context: Six years after the August 5, 2019 abrogation of Article 370 and the reorganisation of J&K into two Union Territories, the move was projected as a catalyst for peace, development, and national integration. While political activity has resumed and a new government is advocating for statehood, the recent Pahalgam terror attack has reignited concerns over security stability in the region.

What were the constitutional, political, and legal justifications behind the abrogation of Article 370?

• Background & Constitutional Position

• • • Article 370 was a “temporary provision” under Part XXI of the Indian Constitution, conferring special status to the erstwhile state of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).
    • It allowed J&K its own Constitution and autonomy over internal matters, while limiting Parliament’s legislative powers in the state.
    • On August 5, 2019, the Union Government abrogated Article 370 via Presidential Order and reorganised the state into two Union Territories: J&K (with legislature) and Ladakh (without legislature).

• Government’s Rationale for Abrogation

• • • National integration: Uniformity in application of central laws.
    • Security: Combating separatism, terrorism, and cross-border insurgency.
    • Governance: Better implementation of central schemes.
    • Socio-economic development: Ensuring equal rights and opportunities for all citizens.

• Judicial Endorsement: In December 2023, the Supreme Court of India upheld the constitutionality of the abrogation, affirming that Article 370 was indeed temporary and that its continuance was “anomalous.”

How has the political landscape evolved post-2019? 

• Democratic restoration: After President’s Rule, Assembly elections were held with 63.88% turnout; Lok Sabha elections in 2024 witnessed the highest participation in 35 years, indicating renewed political engagement.
• Power structure: Despite the formation of a National Conference (NC)-led government, critical departments like Home and Services remain under the Lieutenant Governor, reflecting curtailed autonomy.
• Statehood demand: NC and PDP have passed resolutions seeking restoration of statehood and “special status.”
• Centre–UT tension: Evident in events like the 2025 Martyrs’ Day standoff, indicating friction over regional identity and political assertion.

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How has the security situation evolved in J&K since 2019?

• Security Improvements

• • Terrorist killings dropped from 129 in 2019 to 28 in 2025; stone-pelting, hartals, and separatist mobilisations have virtually ceased.
  • Recruitment into terror groups has become negligible, indicating erosion of insurgent appeal.
  • No stone-pelting cases reported in 2023 (compared to 2,654 in 2010), as per Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) data.

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What are the economic outcomes in J&K post-abrogation?

• Macroeconomic Performance

• • GSDP rose from ₹1.17 lakh crore (2015–16) to ₹2.63 lakh crore (2024–25), but the growth rate slowed after 2019.
  • The per capita income gap with the national average widened — now 76% (down from 84% in 2011–12).
  • Fiscal Stress: Debt at ~60% of GSDP (vs 30% all-India average); fiscal deficit ~6%, breaching FRBM Act norms.

• Unemployment Crisis

• • Unemployment touched 23% in 2023, remaining at 17% in 2024.
  • Among youth (15–29 years), joblessness exceeds 30%, almost double the national average (PLFS data).
  • Labour force participation is rising under economic stress, but industrial employment remains at decadal lows.

• Industrial Development: Disconnect Between Proposals and  Reality

• • ₹1.63 lakh crore worth of industrial proposals, yet actual capital formation is minimal.
  • Annual Survey of Industries (ASI): Factory count stagnating; capital intensity declined since 2016–17.
  • Credit-to-GSDP ratio stands at 38% (vs 99% in Maharashtra), highlighting poor financial intermediation.

• Infrastructure and Energy Development

• • Flagship projects: Udhampur-Srinagar-Baramulla Rail Link completed; 19 road/tunnel projects sanctioned.
  • Energy crisis persists: Despite installation of 5.74 lakh smart meters and 25% drop in T&D losses, winter power availability drops from 3,500 MW to ~600 MW.
  • ₹10,000 crore power infra investment expected to double capacity by 2026.

Linguistic States and Unity: Exposing the Flaws in R N Ravi’s Argument

Context: Tamil Nadu Governor R N Ravi recently criticised the linguistic reorganisation of states, claiming it led to the creation of “second-class citizens.” However, scholars argue that the 1956 reorganisation, though partly based on language, played a vital role in preserving India’s unity and democratic federalism.

What is the historical background of linguistic reorganisation in India, and why was it implemented in 1956?

• Colonial Legacy and Initial Post-Independence Structure

• • At the time of independence, India inherited arbitrary provincial boundaries from the British Raj, which had administered the subcontinent through a dual structure of directly ruled provinces and indirectly governed princely states. 
  • The Constitution of India (1950) organised the country into Part A, B, C, and D States — a categorisation based on administrative convenience rather than linguistic or cultural unity.

• Demand for Linguistic States

• • Despite the Congress’ earlier support for linguistic provinces during the freedom struggle, post-Partition fears of balkanisation led to initial reluctance. The JVP Committee (1949)—comprising Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, and Pattabhi Sitaramayya—warned of “disintegrative tendencies” in linguistic reorganisation.
  • However, popular movements reignited the demand. The death of Potti Sriramulu after a 58-day hunger strike for a Telugu-speaking state led to the formation of Andhra State in 1953, which triggered further agitations across India.

• States Reorganisation Commission (SRC), 1953

• • To address growing demands, the SRC was constituted under Justice Fazl Ali. Its 1955 report clearly stated: “It is neither possible nor desirable to reorganise states solely on the basis of language.”
  • Accordingly, the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 was passed, creating 14 states and 6 Union Territories, primarily considering language, but also administrative, economic, and security factors.

Why has Tamil Nadu Governor R N Ravi criticised linguistic reorganisation, and what does his critique imply?

• Governor R N Ravi’s Position: In July 2025, Governor R N Ravi criticised linguistic reorganisation, stating it created “second-class citizens” and fragmented the “Bharat rashtra”, asserting:
  • Linguistic nationalism created internal conflict.
  • Ethnicity- or language-based states weakened national unity.
  • Certain groups, such as linguistic minorities within states, felt alienated post-reorganisation.

• • He further claimed that states like Tamil Nadu, with diverse linguistic populations, turned exclusive and sidelined non-dominant groups post-linguistic classification.

• Underlying Concerns and Constitutional Counterpoints: While Ravi’s critique invokes national unity, it overlooks constitutional safeguards:

• Article 29 and 30 of the Constitution guarantee minorities the right to preserve their language and culture.
• Eighth Schedule recognition of 22 languages symbolises linguistic pluralism, not division.
  • Article 350A & 350B mandates facilities for linguistic minorities and the appointment of a Special Officer for their welfare.
  • Moreover, linguistic reorganisation did not bar multilingualism within states. Several states (e.g., Maharashtra, Karnataka) have multiple official languages at local levels to ensure inclusivity.

What has been the broader impact of linguistic reorganisation on Indian unity, administration, and federalism?

• Preservation of National Unity: Contrary to fears of fragmentation, scholars like Ramachandra Guha and Paul Brass argue that linguistic accommodation prevented separatism.

• • In India After Gandhi, Guha observes: “Linguistic states helped tame secessionist tendencies… unlike Pakistan and Sri Lanka, where language imposition led to civil wars.”

• Efficient Governance: The Second Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), 2008 stated: “Resolution of linguistic conflicts post-Independence has been one of India’s greatest achievements. Common language provides administrative unity and accessibility.”

• • States like Gujarat and Maharashtra, formed after violent agitations, stabilised rapidly post-reorganisation.

• Strengthening Federalism: Linguistic states empowered regional identity within the federal framework. Regional parties flourished, deepening democracy. Examples:

• • DMK in Tamil Nadu, asserting Tamil identity within constitutional limits. Shiv Sena in Maharashtra, initially built on Marathi pride but functioning within national politics.

How should India reconcile linguistic identity with national unity in the present context?

• Avoiding the “One Language, One Nation” Pitfall

• • India’s Constitution does not designate Hindi as the national language. Article 343 mentions Hindi as the official language, while English continues as the associate official language.
  • Promotion of a singular identity, as implied in Ravi’s reference to “5,000-year-old Bharat rashtra”, ignores constitutional pluralism and risks alienating non-Hindi speaking populations.

• Balanced Approach: A Constitutional and Practical Necessity

• • Promote three-language policy (NEP 2020) with respect for mother tongue.
  • Enhance safeguards for linguistic minorities (Article 350B).
  • Continue decentralised governance with linguistic diversity as a strength, not a threat.

Judicial Discretion and POCSO Bail: Empowering Fair Justice

Context: Recently, a special POCSO court in Mumbai granted bail to a 40-year-old female teacher accused of sexually assaulting a teenage boy, citing the apparent consensual nature of their relationship as a key factor. This case reflects the growing judicial willingness to consider relational context and the victim’s statement while exercising discretion in bail decisions under the POCSO Act.

What Legal Framework Governs Bail under POCSO and What Discretion Does the Judiciary Have?

• The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO), 2012 is a special legislation enacted to safeguard children (below 18 years) from sexual offences. While it criminalises all sexual activity involving minors irrespective of consent, it does not provide explicit statutory guidelines for bail, making judicial discretion the cornerstone of bail decisions.

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Key Judicial Considerations:

• Age of both parties and age gap
• Nature of relationship (romantic/voluntary or coercive)
• Medical evidence – contradictions or lack thereof
• Delay in FIR or inconsistencies in the victim’s statement
• Possibility of false implication (e.g., family enmity)
• Length of custody and trial delay

These are not statutory benchmarks, but evolving judicial norms, enabling courts to humanise justice without compromising child protection.

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• Under procedural law, bail applications are now governed by Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023—replacing Section 439 of the CrPC. 
  • This provision allows Sessions and High Courts to grant bail, considering: Nature and gravity of the offence, Risk of flight or tampering with evidence, Severity of punishment & Conduct of the accused post-offence. 
• However, in POCSO cases, courts are required to weigh constitutional liberties against the best interests of the child. Importantly, POCSO reverses the burden of proof (Section 29), placing the onus on the accused to prove innocence, further complicating bail prospects.

Which Judicial Precedents Shape Bail Decisions in POCSO Cases, and What Factors Have Emerged as Key Considerations?

• Dharmander Singh v. State (Delhi HC, 2020): The court suggested considering the age of the victim and accused, age gap, relationship dynamics, coercion, and accused’s post-offence conduct. Though not binding, this judgment remains widely cited.

• X Juvenile vs. State of U.P. (Allahabad HC, 2024): Bail was granted under the Juvenile Justice Act, ruling that gravity alone cannot deny bail to a minor.
• Mohammad Bilal v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2025): Bail was allowed due to excessive pre-trial custody (3+ years), citing the constitutional right to a speedy trial (Article 21).

How Do Legal Grey Zones Impact Judicial Discretion and Bail Outcomes?

One of the most contested legal grey zones in POCSO cases involves consensual romantic relationships between adolescents, especially when the girl is just below 18 and the boy slightly older.

• No Recognition of Consent Under 18: As per Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act, consent is legally irrelevant if the victim is below 18, making even mutually consensual acts criminal. This creates a paradox where adolescent love is criminalised.

• • • Example: In the 2024 Deshraj @ Musa case, despite the apparent consent, the boy was in jail for five months before bail was granted by the Supreme Court.

• Pending Debate on Lowering Age of Consent: In an ongoing matter, Senior Advocate Indira Jaising urged the Supreme Court to consider reducing the age of consent to 16, highlighting how criminalising adolescent relationships infringes on bodily autonomy and personal liberty (Article 21).

• • However, the Centre’s affidavit warned that any such relaxation could “undermine protective legal frameworks and expose children to greater exploitation”.

What Recent Trends Highlight Evolving Judicial Approaches in POCSO Bail Jurisprudence?

Courts in recent years are increasingly acknowledging the sociological and psychological complexity behind certain POCSO cases, especially involving adolescent consent, false implication, and delayed trials.

• Increasing Reliance on Victim’s Statement: If the victim has recorded a voluntary statement before a magistrate under Section 164 CrPC, indicating no coercion, courts have considered granting bail even if the law doesn’t recognise consent.

• Greater Recognition of Prolonged Pre-Trial Detention: Echoing principles from Economic Survey 2022-23, which highlighted judicial pendency and its impact on undertrial populations, courts are increasingly granting bail where trials are delayed without charges framed (Mohammad Bilal, 2025).

• Role of Medical and Documentary Evidence: Medical evidence contradicting the allegations has been key in Pitamber @ Pitu vs. State of U.P. (2025)—where lack of injury or assault led the court to grant bail.

• Diverging State Practices Around Anticipatory Bail: Earlier, states like Uttar Pradesh had blanket bars on anticipatory bail in POCSO matters. But post Sushila Aggarwal v. State (2020, SC), anticipatory bail cannot be denied outright, though courts still apply stricter scrutiny.

• • Legal Trend: Courts now allow interim protection in genuine cases while ensuring evidence preservation and victim protection.

Legal Aid Systems Hold the Key to Equitable Justice Access

Context: Legal services institutions under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, are mandated to provide free legal aid to nearly 80% of India’s population. Yet, their actual reach remains limited — only 15.5 lakh people accessed legal aid between April 2023 and March 2024, despite a 28% rise from the previous year’s 12.14 lakh.

What are the key challenges faced by legal aid systems in India?

• Low Budget Allocation and Fragmented Funding Structure: Despite being constitutionally mandated (Article 39A), legal aid in India receives less than 1% of the total justice system budget. This underfunding severely constrains infrastructure, human resources, and outreach. 
• Skewed Rural Outreach and Institutional Gaps: Legal aid services are disproportionately urban-centric. One legal aid clinic serves, on average, 163 villages, according to the India Justice Report 2025. 
  • In remote tribal and rural belts, lack of physical access and low legal literacy prevent the marginalised from engaging with the system.
• Declining Para-Legal Volunteer (PLV) Strength: PLVs—often the first point of contact for poor communities—have dropped by 38% between 2019 and 2024. 
  • Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal had only 1 PLV per lakh population in 2023. 
• Bureaucratic Restrictions on Fund Use: NALSA’s 2023 manual restricts expenditure on key services such as hiring project staff, paying for victim compensation, and outreach activities unless specifically approved. These restrictions deter timely responses at the district and village level.

How effective are current legal aid programs in improving access to justice and legal outcomes for the poor?

• Low Beneficiary Reach vs Eligible Population: Though nearly 80% of India’s population is eligible for free legal aid under Section 12 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, only 15.5 lakh people availed it in 2023–24—an improvement from the previous year, but still far below the required scale. 
• Emerging Potential of Legal Aid Defence Counsel (LADC): To professionalise representation for accused persons, NALSA launched the Legal Aid Defence Counsel Scheme (LADC) in 2022, now active in 610 out of 670 districts. 
• State Disparities in Legal Aid Spending: According to the Economic Survey 2023–24 and actual spending figures from NALSA, per capita spending varies drastically: Haryana: ₹16, Jharkhand & Assam: ₹5, Uttar Pradesh: ₹4, Bihar: ₹3, West Bengal: ₹2. This creates uneven justice delivery across States.
• Positive but Limited Lok Adalat Impact: While Lok Adalats and mediation centres promote quick disposal of cases, most are limited to compoundable offences and civil matters. They have succeeded in reducing pendency (as per NALSA Annual Report 2023) but are not substitutes for substantive legal redress for serious rights violations.

What are the main shortcomings in the implementation and resource allocation for legal aid initiatives, and how do these affect their impact?

• Unrevised Honorariums and Delayed Disbursements: PLVs are paid per day, with many States failing to revise honorariums despite inflation. For instance, as of March 2023: Kerala: ₹750/day, 22 States: ₹500/day & Gujarat, Meghalaya, Mizoram: ₹250/day. This demotivates the frontline workforce and leads to high attrition.
• Limited Flexibility in District Legal Services Authorities (DLSAs): DLSAs cannot independently hire staff, conduct outreach, or deploy mobile legal clinics due to strict fund-utilisation clauses under the NALSA Manual (2023). 
• Absence of Accountability and Feedback Mechanisms: There is no standardised grievance redressal or audit system for legal aid quality across districts. Beneficiaries often face dismissive attitudes, poor representation, or delays. The Justice Clock initiative for digitised justice delivery does not include feedback on legal aid efficacy.
• Underutilisation of Social Action Litigation (SAL): Though NALSA is empowered to file social action litigation for vulnerable groups, few cases are proactively initiated. This undercuts the potential of legal aid to address structural issues like bonded labour, caste discrimination, or land alienation in tribal areas.