India’s Asian Balancing Act
Explore India’s Asian balancing act—between weakened Quad, limited SCO role, and rising Indo–Japan maritime partnerships shaping its future strategy.
Introduction
In his op-ed article “The Asian Challenge” (The Indian Express, August 27, 2025), C. Raja Mohan captures the strategic dilemmas and opportunities India now faces in a shifting Asian order. He highlights Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s twin visits to Tokyo and Tianjin as symbolic of India’s balancing act between maritime opportunities and continental constraints. This essay explores the fractured state of the Quad, India’s struggles in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the promise of Indo–Japanese cooperation, before arguing that India’s most viable path to strategic influence lies in maritime partnerships, not continental rivalries.
Continental Pressures
India’s geopolitical environment is marked by difficult constraints. Relations with the United States, though vital, have been strained by protectionist trade policies. Tariffs, retaliations, and disputes over technology transfers have weakened the economic pillar of the U.S.-India partnership, once central to the Quad. At the same time, China has tightened its grip over South Asia by cultivating ties with neighbours such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. Russia, once a dependable ally, is increasingly limited in its ability to provide meaningful support beyond oil exports. These overlapping challenges leave India with little room for manoeuvre, especially on the continental front, where disputes with Pakistan and China persist.
Quad Weakening
The Quad, comprising the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, was once celebrated as the democratic world’s maritime answer to China’s assertiveness. Today, its cohesion is under strain. The Trump administration’s trade war with India has undermined the trust and convergence that sustained the bloc. For New Delhi, this breakdown delivers two consequences: it underscores India’s insistence on strategic autonomy, while also weakening its maritime calculus, as the Quad’s ability to coordinate signals and share intelligence has been reduced. In this context, Japan emerges as the most stable partner—an anchor point for India to sustain momentum even without a strong Quad.
Maritime Prospects
- Raja Mohan argues persuasively that India’s continental ambitions are constrained by geography and disputes, but the maritime domain offers far greater flexibility. Both India and Japan depend heavily on free sea lanes through the Indo-Pacific. Their shared concerns about Chinese assertiveness create fertile ground for cooperation. Naval exercises, intelligence exchanges, and joint infrastructure projects in littoral states provide avenues for strengthening deterrence. Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision and India’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) doctrine align neatly, offering a framework for bilateral and trilateral initiatives even in the absence of robust Quad coordination.
Economic Vulnerabilities
Yet India’s economic vulnerabilities weigh heavily on its diplomacy. Its manufacturing base remains dangerously exposed to Chinese pressure. Restrictions on rare earth magnets, tunnelling equipment, and even skilled engineers have shown Beijing’s ability to destabilise Indian industry. Campaigns such as “Make in India” and “buy swadeshi” cannot quickly reduce this dependency. By contrast, trade disputes with the United States, though serious, are more about terms of engagement between complementary economies rather than structural weakness. This distinction highlights why partnerships with Japan, with its advanced technology and transparent investment practices, are so critical for India’s economic resilience.
SCO Limitations
India’s presence in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation offers continuity but limited benefit. The SCO is dominated by China and Russia, with Pakistan shielded by Beijing against criticism on terrorism. Its agenda is shaped by the Belt and Road Initiative, which India resists. For New Delhi, participation is less about transformation and more about signalling autonomy, preventing exclusion from Central Asian discussions, and managing risks with Beijing. At best, the SCO provides a platform for dialogue on border stability. It cannot, however, serve as a substitute for meaningful strategic advancement.
Indo–Japanese Convergence
Against this background, the India–Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership becomes central. Tokyo, facing its own pressures from Washington, shares India’s need for diversification. Japanese investment in railways, smart cities, and industrial corridors provides India with both economic capital and strategic leverage. Joint efforts to restructure supply chains, foster semiconductor and green energy cooperation, and enhance digital technology transfer create pathways for resilience. Maritime cooperation amplifies these economic ties, making Japan not just an ally of circumstance but a co-equal partner in shaping the Indo-Pacific.
Regional Signalling
India’s tilt towards Japan also carries symbolic weight in Asia. Smaller South and South-East Asian states, wary of Chinese dominance and uncertain of American consistency, look for reassurance that regional sovereignty has champions. By advancing its partnership with Japan, India signals that maritime democracies retain agency to shape the order. This approach also enables India to cultivate alternative minilateral frameworks—such as India–Japan–Australia or India–France–Japan trilaterals—that can sustain momentum even when larger blocs like the Quad falter.
Dual Strategy
A balanced strategy requires compartmentalisation. India must deepen maritime cooperation with Japan for strategic advancement while simultaneously using forums like the SCO to manage risks with China. This dual-track approach prevents overdependence on any single partner and preserves strategic autonomy. The challenge lies in building capacity at home—expanding naval strength, modernising surveillance, and boosting industry—so that external partnerships do not become one-sided. Only then can India project itself as a credible regional actor.
Persistent Challenges
Despite the promise of Indo-Japanese convergence, obstacles remain. Japan is deeply tied to the United States through its security alliance, limiting how far it can decouple initiatives with India. Domestic politics in Tokyo may also temper assertiveness, given constitutional pacifism and shifting leadership. On India’s side, industrial weaknesses and naval capacity deficits could slow the pace of cooperation. Moreover, regional balancing requires reassurance to smaller neighbours that India’s alignment with Japan is inclusive rather than exclusivist.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Prime Minister Modi’s visits to Tokyo and Tianjin embody India’s broader strategic dilemmas. The SCO summit in China, much like earlier, is bound to produce rhetoric but little transformative gain. By contrast, the Tokyo leg carries real potential for reshaping India’s strategic trajectory. As C. Raja Mohan underlines, the key to India’s Asian future lies not in elusive continental primacy but in forging robust maritime partnerships. The weakening of the Quad has clarified rather than clouded this imperative. For India, maritime cooperation with Japan is not simply desirable; it is the strategic axis upon which its twenty-first century role in Asia must turn.
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The Source’s Authority and Ownership of the Article is Claimed By THE STUDY IAS BY MANIKANT SINGH
