Two-Front Deterrence

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Two-Front Deterrence

Context:

India’s defence spending, measured as a percentage of GDP and the national budget, has declined in recent years. 

More on News:

  • Increasing it to 2.5% of GDP from the current 1.9% over the next four years is imperative. 
  • However, a mere budgetary increase is not enough; targeted investments in critical areas are necessary to bridge gaps in India’s defence capabilities and deter adversaries effectively.

Learning from History:

  • A stark reminder of India’s defence shortcomings dates back to December 9, 1971, during the Indo-Pak war. 
  • On this night, INS Khukri, a 1,200-tonne warship, was sunk by the Pakistani submarine PNS Hangor. 
  • Despite being aware of Pakistan’s formidable submarine capabilities, India’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) fleet lacked adequate sonar technology. 
  • Experimental sonars, including one developed in collaboration with the Tata Group, were under testing on the Khukri but failed to perform, leading to significant casualties.
  • The subsequent hunt for Hangor further exposed gaps. A French-made Alizé ASW aircraft was shot down by a Pakistani F-104, highlighting the lack of coordination and readiness. 
  • These avoidable setbacks underline the systemic neglect of critical technological upgrades in India’s defence apparatus.

Understanding Deterrence

Deterrence is a strategic concept in international relations aimed at preventing adversaries from taking undesirable actions, particularly military aggression. It operates on the principle that the potential costs of such actions outweigh any perceived benefits.

Types of Deterrence

  • Deterrence by Denial: It involves strengthening defences or implementing measures that reduce the likelihood of success for an aggressor, such as military fortifications or economic sanctions.
  • Deterrence by Punishment: This approach seeks to convince potential aggressors that any hostile action will result in severe retaliation. 

Theoretical Foundations: Deterrence theory gained prominence during the Cold War, particularly concerning nuclear weapons. The concept is closely associated with the idea of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), where both sides possess enough nuclear capability to ensure that a first strike would lead to devastating retaliation, thereby deterring initial aggression.

Credibility and Communication: For deterrence to be effective, it must be perceived as credible by potential aggressors. Clear communication of deterrent capabilities and intentions is crucial; ambiguity can lead to miscalculations and increased tensions.

Contemporary Challenges: In today’s complex geopolitical landscape, traditional deterrence strategies face challenges due to the rise of non-state actors, cyber warfare, and hybrid threats. The effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is questioned in scenarios involving terrorism or asymmetric warfare, where conventional military responses may not suffice.

Persistent Missile Gap:

  • Fast forward to 2019, during the Pulwama-Balakot incident, the Indian Air Force (IAF) faced another glaring disadvantage
  • Pakistani Air Force (PAF) AMRAAM missiles outranged most of India’s inventory, barring a few French MICA-equipped Mirage fighters. 
  • This missile gap, existing since 2010, persisted until the Rafale jets became operational. 

Strategic Priorities for India’s Defence:

To ensure robust deterrence against adversaries like China and Pakistan, India must adopt a targeted approach:

  • For the Army: Invest in long-range artillery, armed drones, loitering munitions, and modern air defence systems for forward units.
    • Standardise infantry equipment, including small arms, protective gear, night vision devices, secure communication systems, and anti-tank guided missiles.
  • For the Air Force: Accelerate acquisition of refuellers and Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) systems, which are critical force multipliers.
    • Address the falling squadron strength and enhance missile capabilities.
  • For the Navy: Procure heavyweight torpedoes for Scorpene submarines, minesweepers, and swarm boats.
  • Introduce a “navalised” version of the C-295 aircraft to complement the P-8i fleet for medium-range surveillance and ASW duties.

Filling Critical Gaps:

  • Rather than prioritising high-profile acquisitions, India must focus on smaller, cost-effective purchases that address critical operational gaps. 
  • These include modernising artillery ammunition, enhancing air defence systems, and equipping the armed forces with cutting-edge technology for modern warfare.

Mobilising Resources for Defence:

  • Increasing defence spending to 2.5% of GDP can be phased over four years, starting with incremental increases of 0.2% annually. 
  • An additional 0.1% increase alone would generate ~₹30,000 crore for acquisitions. 
  • Alternatively, aggressive privatisation of public sector enterprises could generate significant funds, earmarked exclusively for defence modernisation.

India’s defence preparedness cannot afford a “chalta hai” attitude. Learning from past mistakes, the focus must shift from reactive measures to proactive investments in technology and resources. Clear deterrence against adversaries requires both political will and strategic foresight.

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